libertarianly

English

Etymology

From libertarian +‎ -ly.

Adverb

libertarianly (comparative more libertarianly, superlative most libertarianly)

1. In a libertarian manner.
   • 1968, R[ichard] L[angdon] Franklin, “Basic Presuppositions”, in Freewill and Determinism: A Study of Rival Conceptions of Man (International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York, N.Y.: Humanities Press, →ISBN, section III (The Nature of the Debate), page 48:

     The typical libertarian sees he has two sorts of opponents, but in fact he has three, and the position of the third is more radical than he has realised. (i) There are indeed those who have not analysed the issue correctly, such as philosophers who accuse him of confusion between prescriptive and descriptive law. (ii) There are indeed those who experience their choice ‘libertarianly’ and then treat this as illusion on a priori grounds.

   • 1984, S[elwyn] A[lfred] Grave, “‘Australian Materialism’”, in A History of Philosophy in Australia, St Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press, →ISBN, pages 137–138:

     The most fundamental disagreement between the deterministically-minded and the libertarianly-minded has to do with the question of man’s continuity with nature. Against the discontinuity presupposed by a libertarian position on free will, Franklin thinks there is set “the whole development and ethos of scientific thought”.

   • 1993 winter, Kingsley Widmer, “Anarchist Aesthetics: A Few Notes Towards a Libertarian View of the Arts”, in Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed, volume 13, number 1/35, Columbia, Mo.: C.A.L. [Columbia Anarchist League] Press, →ISSN, pages 50 and 53:

     This may be appropriate counter to some current ostensibly libertarian “aesthetics of social ecology” (such as Suzi Gablik, The Reenchantment of Art), which anti-modernistically (and Bookchininly) promotes arts “emphasizing our essential interconnectedness rather than our separateness, forms evoking the feeling of belonging to a larger whole rather than expressing the isolated, alienated self.” Sounds libertarianly hopeful, but that is to be done by would-be upbeat communal art-experiences formed by shaman artists, exploiting all the dubious mythologies handy, recreating an enchanting religion of art, for which there seem to be plenty of aspirants, and New Age markets. […] No doubt my aesthetic reflections are partly crippled from my being an habitual inmate of libraries and museums, and fettered with the intellectual’s defensive irony. Hence I self-skeptically make no totalizing claim for any anarchist aesthetic, which may well find other freedoms than mine. But one can, I libertarianly hope, also counteringly learn. Artful play is where you find and live it, like the bird against the contrary winds.

   • 1996, Jan Clifford Lester, “Market-Anarchy, Liberty, and Pluralism”, in John T. Sanders, Jan Narveson, editors, For and Against the State: New Philosophical Readings, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., →ISBN, page 66:

     The other person always has a libertarian claim to what we explicitly give him a future claim to or contract to give him (if he keeps his side of the contract and if we have acquired our property by libertarian means). We cannot libertarianly insist that he instead accept compensation merely for any inconvenience. […] Murray Newton Rothbard considers that contractual specific performance and contractual slavery cannot be libertarianly possible because he thinks that this requires the person to “alienate his will” and that this is logically impossible.

   • 1997, Keith E[dward] Yandell, “Religious experience”, in Philip L[awrence] Quinn, Charles Taliaferro, editors, A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy), Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers Inc.;  […], →ISBN, part VI (The Justification of Theistic Belief), page 370:

     This definition would be problematic, at least for a theist, if it entailed that Mary could not be a creature relative to God or Mary must be a mode or state of God rather than a substance. But none of these things do follow. Mary need not, in my technically defined sense, be an object relative to God in order for Mary to be, say, a libertarianly free self-conscious substance (i.e. a person).

   • 1998, John [Ernest] Sanders, “Notes”, in The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence, Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, →ISBN, page 317:

     Is significant freedom or is only libertarian freedom necessary for loving relationships? If libertarian freedom is all that is required, then one might suggest that God could have created libertarianly free beings who would freely love him and one another.