Template:RQ:Hamilton Metaphysics and Logic/documentation

Usage

This template may be used on Wiktionary entry pages to quote from William Hamilton's work Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic (1st edition, 1859–1860, 4 volumes). It can be used to create a link to online versions of the work at the HathiTrust Digital Library, Google Books, and the Internet Archive:

• Volume I (Lectures on Metaphysics, volume I).
• Volume II (Lectures on Metaphysics, volume II).
• Volume III (Lectures on Logic, volume I).
• Volume IV (Lectures on Logic, volume II).

Parameters

The template takes the following parameters:

• |1= or |volume= – mandatory: the volume number quoted from in uppercase Roman numerals, from |volume=I to |volume=IV.
• |2= or |chapter= – the name of the chapter quoted from.
• |section= – a section quoted from.
• |3= or |page=, or |pages= – mandatory in some cases: the page number(s) quoted from. When quoting a range of pages, note the following:
  • Separate the first and last pages of the range with an en dash, like this: |pages=10–11.
  • You must also use |pageref= to indicate the page to be linked to (usually the page on which the Wiktionary entry appears).

This parameter must be specified to have the template link to the online version of the work.

• |4=, |text=, or |passage= – the passage to be quoted.
• |footer= – a comment on the passage quoted.
• |brackets= – use |brackets=on to surround a quotation with brackets. This indicates that the quotation either contains a mere mention of a term (for example, “some people find the word manoeuvre hard to spell”) rather than an actual use of it (for example, “we need to manoeuvre carefully to avoid causing upset”), or does not provide an actual instance of a term but provides information about related terms.

Examples

• Wikitext:
  • {{RQ:Hamilton Metaphysics and Logic|volume=II|chapter=Lecture XXIII. The Presentative Faculty.—I. Perception,—Was Reid a Natural Realist?|page=78|passage=Our knowledge of mind and matter, as substances, is merely relative; they are known to us only in their qualities; and we can justify the postulation of two different substances, exclusively on the supposition of the the incompatibility of the double series of phænomena to '''coinhere''' in one.}}; or
  • {{RQ:Hamilton Metaphysics and Logic|II|Lecture XXIII. The Presentative Faculty.—I. Perception,—Was Reid a Natural Realist?|78|Our knowledge of mind and matter, as substances, is merely relative; they are known to us only in their qualities; and we can justify the postulation of two different substances, exclusively on the supposition of the the incompatibility of the double series of phænomena to '''coinhere''' in one.}}
• Result:
  • 1859, William Hamilton, “Lecture XXIII. The Presentative Faculty.—I. Perception,—Was Reid a Natural Realist?”, in H[enry] L[ongueville] Mansel and John Veitch, editors, Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic […], volume II, Edinburgh, London: William Blackwood and Sons, →OCLC, page 78:

    Our knowledge of mind and matter, as substances, is merely relative; they are known to us only in their qualities; and we can justify the postulation of two different substances, exclusively on the supposition of the the incompatibility of the double series of phænomena to coinhere in one.