Missing philosophy sense, contrasted with effectivism?

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Saw this in Google Books' snippet of The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death (2015, page 331), which seems to be quoting Steven Luper's Retroactive Harms and Wrongs [1] — so it may not have been used outside of that one paper. But it says:

For example, in now desiring that I will marry next week, I now get what I want if it is now true that I will marry next week. There is, however, another view. Perhaps my desire for P is not fulfilled at T unless P's truth maker occurs at T. At issue is which of the following positions is correct:
Conformist claim: Subject S's desire P is fulfilled at T only if, at T, S desires P and P holds.
Effectivist claim: Subject S's desire P is fulfilled at T only if, at T, S desires P and P's truth maker occurs.

He adds, "There are, of course, further alternatives to conformism and effectivism..." Equinox 18:42, 28 June 2020 (UTC)Reply

Return to "conformism" page.