parade of horribles
English edit
.jpg)
Pronunciation edit
Audio (AU) (file)
Noun edit
parade of horribles (plural parades of horribles)
- A parade featuring a progression of people wearing comic and grotesque costumes, commonly accompanied by floats and models representing monsters.
- (law, informal) Any rhetorical device presenting a series of terrible results that notionally might follow from an act, instead of confining the argument to the explicit terms of any applicable law.
- 1970, Philip B. Kurland, “Enter the Burger Court: The Constitutional Business of the Supreme Court”, in The Supreme Court Review, Vol. 1970, pages 48–49:
- The Chief Justice was adamant, if alone:
'Nothing in the language or gloss previously placed on this provision of the Fifth Amendment remotely justifies the treatment which the Court today accords to the collateral-estoppel doctrine. Nothing in the purpose of the authors of the Constitution commands or even justifies what the Court decides today; this is truly a case of expanding a sound basic principle beyond the bounds — or needs — of its rational and legitimate objectives to preclude harassment of the accused.'
His position rested on the proposition that a second prosecution was barred only if it was for the same offense and here the victims were different and, therefore, the offenses were different. After a parade of horribles, the Chief Justice concluded:
'What the Court is holding is, in effect that the second and third and fourth criminal acts are "free", unless the accused is tried for the multiple crimes in a single trial — something defendants frantically use every legal device to avoid, and often succeed in avoiding. This is the reality of what the Court holds today; it does not make good sense and it cannot make good law.' .
- 1980, Warren E. Burger, “Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)”, in Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center: Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), page 316:
- To buttress his argument, the petitioner, with the support of amicus, points to grave risks that may be generated by research endeavors such as respondents. The briefs present a gruesome parade of horribles. Scientists, among them Nobel laureates, are quoted suggesting that genetic research may pose a serious threat to the human race, or, at the very least, that the dangers are far too substantial to permit such research to proceed apace at this time. We are told that genetic research and related technological developments may spread pollution and disease, that it may result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice may tend to depreciate the value of human life. These arguments are forcefully, even passionately, presented; they remind us that, at times, human ingenuity seems unable to control fully the forces it creates — that, with Hamlet, it is sometimes better 'to bear those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of.'
It is argued that this Court should weigh these potential hazards in considering whether respondent's invention is patentable subject matter under §101. We disagree. The grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms is not likely to put an end to genetic research or to its attendant risks. The large amount of research that has already occurred when no researcher had sure knowledge that patent protection would be available suggests that legislative or judicial fiat as to patentability will not deter the scientific mind from probing into the unknown any more than Canute could command the tides. Whether respondent's claims are patentable may determine whether research efforts are accelerated by the hope of reward or slowed by want of incentives, but that is all.
- 1992, Geoffrey R. Stone, Richard Allen Epstein, Cass R. Sunstein, The Bill of Rights in the Modern State, page 356:
- The majority trotted out a parade of horribles in which judicial line-drawing concerning accommodation would displace legitimate democratic choices.